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Abstract We analyze the security of a quantum secure direct communication
protocol equipped with authentication. We first propose a specific attack on
the protocol by which, an adversary can break the secret already shared be-
tween Alice and Bob, when he (adversary) runs the protocol few times. The
attack shows that there is a gap in authentication procedure of the proto-
col, and by doing so the adversary can obtain the key without remaining any
trace of himself. We then give the modification of the protocol and analyze
the security of it, and show how the modified protocol can close the gap.
Keywords quantum secure direct communication · attack · authentication ·
single photon · cryptanalysis · security
1 Introduction
Over the last decades, quantum cryptography plays a significant role in ab-
stract theory of information and communication security. It is divided into
some major research topics, such as QKD 1, QSS 2, QIA 3, etc. which have
developped from their firs publications [1-3] respectively, untill now.
A new topic of quantum cryptography which has been studied at depth,
comprehensively recently, is quantum secure direct communication, known as
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QSDC in the literature. The goal of QSDC is to convey a secret message
directly without a key generating session to encrypt the message. Like many
other topics of quantum cryptography, there are two approahces to research
on QSDC: quantum entanglement [4], [5], [6], [7], and single photons [8], [9],
[10], [11], [12], [13].
Recently many papers have been published in QSDC and some related
topics such as quantum dialogue (QD) and quantum secure direct dialogue
(QSDD). In 2013, Chang et al. proposed a QSDC protocol equipped with au-
thentication [10]. Chou et al. proposed a bidirectional QSDC protocol for mo-
bile network [14]. In 2014 Lai et al. proposed a quantum direct secret sharing
(QDSD) scheme using fountain codes for eavesdropping check and authenti-
cation [15]; a pre-shared sequence of degrees and positions is applied to recog-
nize the additional qubits. Hwang et al. introduced a new topic in quantum
cryptography called quantum authencryption, combining quantum encryption
and quantum authentication into one process for off-line communications [11].
Yang put forward a QSDC protocol without quantum memory; a stream is
replaced by quantum data block to transmit quantum states [12]. Chang et
al. proposed a controlled QSDC protocol; they used five-particle cluster state
and quantum one time pad [6]. Zou and Qiu introduced a semiquantum se-
cure direct communication protocol with classical Alice [13]. Gao analyzed the
protocol proposed in [14] and suggested a possible improvement of it [16]. In
2015, to combat collective-dephasing noise and collective-rotation noise, Ye
put forward two QD protocols [17] and a QSDD protocol [18]. Xiao and Xu
proposed a high- capasity quantum secure communication scheme using either
entangled pairs and an auxiliary single photon [19]. Hassanpour and Housh-
mand put forward a three-party controlled QSDC based on GHZ-like states
which improves the efficiency of the previous ones [7]. Ma et al. presented a di-
rect communication protocol of quantum network over noisy channel by which
the bit-flip errors whould be corrected using a parity matrix [20]. Chang et
al. put forwarda controlled deterministic secure quantum communication pro-
tocol with limited bases for preparing and measurement of qubits [21]. An
experimental implementation of proposed protocol in [5], is introduced by Hu
et al. [22]. Mi et al. presented a QSDC scheme using orbital angular momen-
tum of photons to reach higher capacity and security [23]. In 2016, Uhlmann
found that the anti-(conjugate) linearity plays an importatnt role in the se-
curity of quantum cryptographic protocols [24]. Li and Yin suggested feasible
quantum information processing in terms of living cells which may be applied
to experimental demonstration of quantum systems [25].
As mentioned, Chang et al. put forward a QSDC and authentication pro-
tocol based on single photons, in which it is assumed that Alice and Bob
have two secret strings IDA and IDB. Analysis of the protocol shows that it is
immune against most attcks such as man-in-the-middle attack and quantum
teleportation attack [10]. The current article, discovers a new attack on the re-
cent protocol to reaveal the secret information. The attack scenario is divided
into two scenes. At the first scene, the attacker who is called “Oscar” tries to
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obtain IDB by sending some separate messages to Bob. At the second scene,
he tries to obtain IDA by braeking a simple XOR-encryption.
The rest of the article is as follows. Section 2 reviwes Chang et al.’s protocol
without any example. For a complete picture of the protocol and also related
examples, we refer the readers to see [10] and refrences therein. Section 3 is
devoted to present the new attack. In section 4, the accuracy of the new attack
is studied, and the probability of perfect success after an arbitrary number of
iterations is calculted in two cases: the worst case and the average case. Finally
the conclusions of this article is summerized in section 5.
2 Review of Chang et al.’s Protocol
Throughout this section we briefly present a short review of Chang et al.’s
Protocol. Alice and Bob have two secret binary strings (a1, a2, . . . , an) :=
IDA and (b1, b2, . . . , bu) := IDB, already shared between themselves, which
represent Alice’s identity and Bob’s one respectively. Suppose that Alice wants
to send Bob a secret binary message (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) :=M . Then Alice and
Bob persue the following procedure:
Step 1 Alice encrypts M with IDA using the simple XOR-operation and obtains
(c1, c2, . . . , cn) := C, where ci = mi + ai mod 2, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Step 2 According to C, Alice creates n qubits, called SC in the manner: if a bit of
C is 0, she prepares the corresponding qubit in |0〉 or |+〉 state at random;
otherwise she prepares the corresponding qubit in |1〉 or |−〉 state randomly.
According to IDB, Alice prepares u qubits, called SIDB as follows: if a bit
of IDB is 0, she randomly prepares the qubit in |0〉 or |1〉 state; otherwise
she randomly prepares the qubit in |+〉 or |−〉 state. Alice inserts SIDB to
SC randomly which forms a new binary sequence called SC′ and sends it
to Bob.
Step 3 After Bob receives SC′ , Alice publicly announces the positions of SIDB in
SC′ . Then Bob extracts SIDB and measures these photons in the correct
bases according to IDB. If a bit of IDB is 0, he measures the corresponding
qubit in BZ = {|0〉, |1〉}; otherwise, BX = {|+〉, |−〉} will be applied.
Step 4 Bob announces the state of photons in SIDB which he received; the basis
information is not included in this announcement. For example, Bob uses
bit 0 to denote state |0〉 and |+〉, and 1 for |1〉 and |−〉. According to the
above rule, Alice obtains the state of the initial SIDB. Alice compares Bob’s
result with the state of initial SIDB. If the error rate is low enough, Alice
believes that Bob is legal and no eavesdropping exists. In this condition,
the communication goes on; otherwise she interrupts it. Alice and Bob
discard the bits in SIDB, where the corresponding photons in SIDB are not
received by Bob.
Step 5 Alice publicly announces the bases of photons in SC . Bob measures SC in
correct bases and obtains C.
Step 6 Bob decrypts C with IDA bit by bit using simple XOR-operation: mi =
ci + ai mod 2, for i = 1, . . . , n. In other words, M = C ⊕ IDB (Note that,
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“⊕” is used to represent XOR-operation of two binary strings with same
lengths).
Step 7 Alice takes another n-bit binary string of secret message, called M1 and
starts the next transmission.
3 Description of The New Attack
As mentioned in previous section, the authentication inside the protocol is
unidirectional, i.e. just Alice can verify Bob’s identity and demonstrates his
legitimacy. Therfore Bob cannot verify the sender’s identity. Hence anyone
can impersonate Alice and sends some arbitrary messages (indeed qubits) to
Bob. First, we briefly explain the novel attack; the scenario of the attack is
composed of two scenes:
First scene of the attack. Oscar prepares a binary sequence of length u, such
as (e1, e2, . . . , eu) := idB (Note that idB 6= IDB in general). In fact idB is a
candidate for Bob’s identity binary string and changes after each session untill
coincides (with high probability) on IDB.
According to idB, Oscar creates a sequnece of qubits and obtains SidB as
follows: if a bit of idB is 0, the corresponding qubit of SidB is |0〉; otherwise, it
is |−〉. Next he creates a random qubit sequence as SC and mixes it to SidB,
obtaining SC′ . Then he sends SC′ to Bob.
Invoking the protocol, after Bob receives SC′ , Oscar announces the posi-
tions of SidB in SC′ . Then Bob measures the polarization of any photon of
SidB due to the corresponding bit of IDB. The rule is that he uses BZ basis,
for corresponding “0” bits and BX for “1” bits. Then Bob announces the state
of photons in SidB he received. As mentioned at step 4 of the protocol, without
lose generality, assume that Bob uses bit 0 to denote state |0〉 or |+〉, and 1
for |1〉 or |−〉.
In other words, if a bit of the string which announced by Bob is 0, it means
that the corresponding qubit he received is either |0〉 or |+〉; otherwise, it is
either |1〉 or |−〉.
Thus, Oscar obtains the state of the initial SidB. He compares Bob’s re-
sult with the state of initial SidB. If a bit of the string which announced by
Bob, and the corresponding qubit of SidB do not match, Oscar concludes that
the corresponding bit of idB, say ei is wrong and changes it; otherwise the
corresponding bit of idB is probably correct, and the probabity of the cor-
rectness depends on the number of session iterations. By this manner, after
each iteration a new idB replaced by the previous one. If after k iterations, no
non-matching case is observed in a position, it means that the bit is correct
with probability 1 − 2−k. Therfore, if remain t matchings after k iterations,
the probability of coincident of idB and IDB will be (1− 2
−k)t.
After Oscar obtains IDB (with high enough probability), he can imperson-
ate Bob.
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Second scene of the attack. Oscar intercepts the communication between Alice
and Bob. Since Oscar has IDB, when Alice announces the positions of SIDB
in SC′ , Oscar measures the qubits in correct bases (with high enough proba-
bility). So Alice will be deceived, and the communication goes on. Then she
announces the bases of photons in SC . Therfore Oscar has C, which is the
message encrypted by IDA using simple XOR-operation. Hence he can break
it easily; see [26] and refrences therein.
4 Numerical Exmaples and Discussion
It is clarified at step 4 of the protocol, that Alice considers the error rate
when she compares Bob’s result with the state of initial SIDB. If it is low
enough, Alice verifies the legitimacy of the receiver; see section 2. Suppose
that the error rate of the quantum channel is ǫ, and idB differs with IDB
in t positions at the beginning of session described in the first scene of the
attack. We show that after a few number of iterations, the first scene of the
attack will be successful, considering ǫ < 0.02 (and even in ideal cases with
high probability). After k iterations of the session, ⌈(1− (3/4)k).t⌉ wrong bits
of idB, will be corrected, on average (since (3/4)
n −→ 0 and the number of
iterations is a discrete quantity, the ceiling function is used). Also it will be
clear to Oscar that each of the other (u − t) bits is same as the correponding
bits of IDB with probability (1−2
−k). So, after k iterations, Oscar knows that
every changed bit of latest idB is correct, and the remaining x -bit substring
is probably the same as the corresponding substring of IDB. Hence after k
iterations, if x bits do not change, idB = IDB with probabilty (1 − 2
−k)x.
Table 1 shows the probability of equality idB = IDB after k iterations with
several lengths of IDB.
Table 1 the probability of coincident in the worst case with k iterations.
No. of iterations The length of IDB
k (32-bit) (64-bit) (128-bit)
10 96.9% 93.9% 88.2%
11 98.4% 96.9% 93.9%
12 99.2% 98.4% 96.9%
13 99.6% 99.2% 98.4%
Note that table 1, shows the probability of succes in the worst-case for some
number of iterations, i.e. the correction of wrong bits is not considered. But in
general, the probabilty of success increases. Let u be the length of IDB. Then
there will be t 6 u wrong bits in the first candidate idB. So, as mentioned
above, after k iterations of the session, ⌈(1− (3/4)k).t⌉ wrong bits, on average,
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will be corrected. We consider t = u/2. Table 2 shows the probability of success
in the average-case.
Table 2 the probability of coincident in the average case with k iterations.
No. of iterations The length of IDB
k (32-bit) (64-bit) (128-bit)
10 98.4% 96.8% 93.6%
11 99.2% 98.4% 96.8%
12 99.6% 99.1% 98.4%
13 99.8% 99.6% 99.2%
5 Modification of The Protocol
As explained in the previous sections, Chang et.al.’s protocol may be broken
by the proposed attack. In this section we expose a proposal to reinforce the
protocol. Since the loophole of the protocol is originated from “unidirectional”
authentication, we propose a method for mutual authentication. This strategy
can close the loophole and make the protocol more strong and resistant to the
new attack. Since in the original protocol, it is assumed that Alice and Bob
already sheared two secret strings IDA and IDB, we will also suppose that Alice
and Bob have common secrets containing IDA := (a1, a2, . . . , a2ℓ), IDB :=
(b1, b2, . . . , bu) and secret key KAB := (k1, k2, . . . , kn). Also the authentication
procedure and sending the secret message will be based on single photons and
quantum memory as in the original protocol. The modofied protocol to send
the message M := (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) is as follows:
Step 1 Alice encrypts the message M by KAB using XOR-operation, so that she
obtains C = M ⊕KAB.
Step 2 Exactly like the original protocol, Alice prepares SC and SIDB. In addition,
She creates ℓ qubits, called SIDA, according to IDA. The procedure of
creating SIDA is that Alice randomly chooses ℓ bits of IDA as an ordered
basis string by the rule: 0 ≡ BZ and 1 ≡ BX . The remaining ℓ bits are
used as an ordered qubit string measured (after reordering if neccessary) in
the corresponding bases by the rule: 0 ≡ |0〉 or |+〉 and 1 ≡ |1〉 or |−〉 due
to the corresponding basis. Then Alice inserts SIDA and SIDB randomly to
SC , obtaining S
′
C
, and sends it to Bob.
Step 3 After Bob receives S′
C
, Alice announces the positions of SIDA, t bits of IDA
used for sent qubits by order, and SIDB. Then Bob extracts the qubits of
SIDA and SIDB.
Step 4 Bob measures the qubits of SIDA and checks the legitimacy of Alice. If she
is legal, then Bob measures the qubits of SIDB and sends the result to Alice
exactly like the original protocol; otherwise he interrupts it.
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Step 5 Alice cheks the leitimacy of Bob as described in [10]. If he is legal, she
announces the bases of SC qubits; otherwise she interrupts the communi-
cation.
Step 6 Bob decrypts message C by KAB, using XOR-operation to obtain the plain-
text message M.
6 Security Analysis of The Modified Protocol
As analyzed in [10], the original protocol is secure against most attacks such as
man in the middle attack and quantum teleportation attack, but the proposed
attack can break the protocol and the attacker can obtain IDA and IDB which
are secrets already shared between Alice and Bob. The modification of the
protocol which is proposed in the previous section, can fill the loophole of teh
protocol. Since the loophole is emanated from unidirectional authentication,
applying the bidirectional authentication proposed in the previous section fills
it up. Formal speaking, suppose that attacker Oscar tries to impersonate Al-
ice, and sends Bob a message. When Bob receives the message, Oscar should
announces the positions of ℓ bits of IDA, which show his legitimacy. So he
cannot impersonate Alice, unless he accesses to IDA. Therfore any non-legal
person who does not access to IDA, cannot deceive Bob. On the other hand, if
an adversary tries to impersonate Bob, after he receives the message, obtains
no information about IDA. More precisely, it is possible that an adversary
receives the message, since Bob proves his legitimacy after Alice. But there is
nothing to worry about, because when Alice announces the positions of the
ℓ verification bits, she does not declare the correct bases of them. So the ad-
versary obtains no information about IDA. Moreover he cannot impersonate
Bob (unless he accesses to IDB). Therfore when Alice checks the legitimacy of
the receiver, would not been deceived and interrupts the communication. In
this situation, reordering of ℓ verification bits is neccessary to retry sending
the message. To reach more scurity it is suggested that a derangment on ℓ
verification bits be applied. Note that repetition of sending message to a non-
legal person, allows him to guess IDA applying a same method described in
the first scene of the attack; see section 3. Hence, one can deduce if a qubit
of IDA loses once because of noisy channel or eavesdropping, it can be sent
in the next transmissions safely, provided that its corresponding basis index,
changes. However if a fixed qubit loses twice, it must be discarded.
Clearly the modified protocol defeat man-in-the-middle attack and quan-
tum teleportation attack as the original protocol can.
7 Conclusion
We have demostrated that Chang et al.’s protocol, is vulnerable to a specific
attack, which is described in this article. Our attack scenario is divided into
two scenes. Since Bob cannot check Alice’s legitimacy, at the first scene, Os-
car impersonates Alice. Then he chooses a candidate binary string for IDB,
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and corrects the wrong bits of it by sending a message several times to Bob,
due to the original protocol. After afew iterations, he obtains IDB, with high
enough probability. At the second scene, Oscar intercepts the transmission
between Alice and Bob, and impersonates Bob easily. Then he can receive any
message which is sent by Alice, measure the qubits in the correct bases, and
finally obtain IDA by breaking a simple XOR-encryption. Since the loophole of
the protocol is originated from the unidirectional authentication, the mutual
authentication is suggested to defeat the attack. Furthermore the modified
protocol is secure against all attacks which the original one is.
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In a recent article, Chang et al. proposed a quantum secure direct communication pro-
tocol using single photons (Chinese Sci Bull, 58: 4571-4576). The protocol is equipped
with auhtentication. In this article we present a novel attack on the protocol that can
determine the secret key which is already shared between Alice and Bob.
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1. Introduction
Over the last decades, quantum cryptography plays a significant role in abstract
theory of information and communication security. It is divided into some major
research topics, such as QKD a, QSS b, QIA c, etc. which have developped from
their firs publications Refs. 1–3 respectively, untill now.
A new topic of quantum cryptography which has been studied at depth, com-
prehensively recently, is quantum secure direct communication, known as QSDC.
The goal of QSDC is to convey a secret message directly without a key generating
session to encrypt the message. Like many other topics of quantum cryptography,
there are two approahces to research on QSDC: quantum entanglement Refs. 4, 5
and single photons Refs. 6, 7. In 2013, Chang et al. proposed a QSDC protocol8
equipped with authentication, based on sinle photons . In the article, it is assumed
that Alice and Bob have two secret strings IDA and IDB. As mentioned in the re-
cent article, the protocol is immune against most attcks such as man-in-the-middle
attack and quantum teleportation attack.
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The current article, presents a new attack on the recent protocol to reaveal the
secret information. The attack scenario is divided into two scenes. At the first scene
the attacker who is called “Oscar” tries to obtain IDB by sending some separate
messages to Bob. At the second scene he tries to obtain IDA by braeking a simple
XOR-encryption.
The rest of the article is as follows. Section 2 reviwes Chang et al.’s protocol
without any example. For a complete picture of the protocol and also related exam-
ples, we refer the readers to see Ref. 8 and refrences therein. Section 3 is devoted to
present the new attack. In section 4, the accuracy of the new attack is studied, and
the probability of perfect success after an arbitrary number of iterations is calculted
in two cases: the worst case and the average case. Finally the conclusions of this
article is summerized in section 5.
2. Review of Chang et al.’s Protocol
Throughout this section we briefly present a short review of Chang et al.’s Pro-
tocol. Alice and Bob have two secret binary strings (a1, a2, . . . , an) := IDA and
(b1, b2, . . . , bu) := IDB, already shared between themselves, which represent Alice’s
identity and Bob’s one respectively. Suppose that Alice wants to send Bob a secret
binary message (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) := M . Then Alice and Bob persue the following
procedure:
Step 1. Alice encrypts M with IDA using the simple XOR-operation and obtains
(c1, c2, . . . , cn) := C, where ci = mi + ai mod 2, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Step 2. According to C, Alice creates n qubits, called SC in the manner: if the
bit of C is 0, she prepares the corresponding qubit in |0〉 or |+〉 state at random;
otherwise she prepares the corresponding qubit in |1〉 or |−〉 state randomly. Ac-
cording to IDB, Alice prepares u qubits, called SIDB as follows: if a bit of IDB is 0,
she randomly prepares the qubit in |0〉 or |1〉 state; otherwise she randomly prepares
the qubit in |+〉 or |−〉 state. Alice inserts SIDB to SC randomly (forms sequence
SC′) and sends it to Bob.
Step 3. After Bob receives SC′ , Alice publicly announces the positions of SIDB
in SC′ . Then Bob extracts SIDB and measures these photons in the correct bases
according to IDB. If a bit of IDB is 0, he measures the corresponding qubit in
BZ = {|0〉, |1〉}; otherwise, BX = {|+〉, |−〉} will be applied.
Step 4. Bob announces the state of photons in SIDB which he received; the basis
information is not included in this announcement. For example, Bob uses bit 0 to
denote state |0〉 and |+〉, and 1 for |1〉 and |−〉. According to the above rule, Alice
obtains the state of the initial SIDB. Alice compares Bob’s result with the state of
initial SIDB. If the error rate is low enough, Alice believes that Bob is legal and
no eavesdropping exists. In this condition, the communication goes on; otherwise
she interrupts it. Alice and Bob discard the bits in SIDB, where the corresponding
photons in SIDB are not received by Bob.
Step 5. Alice publicly announces the bases of photons in SC . Bob measures SC
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in correct bases and obtains C.
Step 6. Bob decrypts C with IDA bit by bit using simple XOR-operation: mi =
ci + ai mod 2, for i = 1, . . . , n. In other words, M = C ⊕ IDB (Note that, “⊕” is
used to represent XOR-operation).
Step 7. Alice takes another n-bit binary string of secret message, called M1 and
starsts the next transmission.
3. Description of The New Attack
As mentioned in previous section, the authentication inside the protocol is direct,
i.e. just Alice can verify Bob’s identity and demonstrates his legitimacy. Therfore
Bob cannot verify the sender’s identity. Hence anyone can impersonate Alice and
sends some arbitrary messages (indeed qubits) to Bob. First, we briefly explain the
novel attack; the scenario of the attack is composed of two scenes:
3.1. First scene of the attack
Oscar prepares a binary sequence of length u, called idB(e1, e2, . . . , eu). (Note that
idB 6= IDB in general). In fact idB is a candidate for Bob’s identity binary string
and changes after each session untill coincides (with high probability) on IDB.
According to idB, Oscar creates a sequnece of qubits and obtains SidB as follows:
if a bit of idB is 0, the corresponding qubit of SidB is |0〉; otherwise, it is |−〉. Next
he creates a random qubit sequence as SC and mixes it to SidB, obtaining SC′ .
Then he sends SC′ to Bob.
Invoking the protocol, after Bob receives SC′ , Oscar announces the positions of
SidB in SC′ . Then Bob measures the polarization of any photon of SidB due to the
corresponding bit of IDB. The rule is that he uses BZ basis, for corresponding “0”
bits and BX for “1” bits.
Then Bob announces the state of photons in SidB he received. As mentioned at
step 4 of the protocol, without lose generality, assume that Bob uses bit 0 to denote
state |0〉 or |+〉, and 1 for |1〉 or |−〉.
In other words, if a bit of the string which announced by Bob is 0, it means
that the corresponding qubit he received is either |0〉 or |+〉; otherwise, it is either
|1〉 or |−〉.
Thus, Oscar obtains the state of the initial SidB. He compares Bob’s result with
the state of initial SidB. If a bit of the string which announced by Bob, and the
corresponding qubit of SidB do not match, Oscar concludes that the corresponding
bit of idB, say ei is wrong and changes it; otherwise the corresponding bit of idB is
probably correct, and the probabity of the correctness depends on the number of
session iterations. By this manner, after each iteration a new idB replaced by the
previous one. If after k iterations, no non-matching case is observed in a position,
it means that the bit is correct with probability 1 − 2−k. Therfore, if remain t
matchings after k iterations, the probability of coincident of idB and IDB will be
(1− 2−k)t.
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After Oscar obtains IDB (with high enough probability), he can impersonate
Bob.
3.2. Second scene of the attack
Oscar intercepts the communication between Alice and Bob. Since Oscar has IDB,
when Alice announces the positions of SIDB in SC′ , Oscar measures the qubits in
correct bases (with high enough probability). So Alice will be deceived, and the
communication goes on. Then she announces the bases of photons in SC . Therfore
Oscar has C, which is the message ecrypted by IDA using simple XOR-operation.
Hence he can break it easily; see Ref. 9 and refrences therein.
4. Numerical Exmaples and Discussion
It is clarified at step 4 of the protocol, that Alice considers the error rate when
she compares Bob’s result with the state of initial SIDB. If it is low enough, Alice
verifies the legitimacy of the receiver; see section 2. Suppose that the phase error
rate of the channel is ǫ, and idB differs with IDB in t positions at the beginning of
session described in the first scene of the attack. We show that after a few number
of iterations, the first scene of the attack will be successful, for ǫ < 0.05. After k
iterations of the session, ⌈(1 − (3/4)k).t⌉ wrong bits of idB, will be corrected, on
average (since (3/4)n −→ 0 and the number of iterations is a discrete quantity, the
ceiling function is used). Also it will be clear to Oscar that each of the other (u− t)
bits is same as the correponding bit of IDB with probability (1 − 2
−k). So, after k
iterations, Oscar knows that every changed bit of latest idB is exactly correct, and
the remaining x -bit substring is probably the same as the corresponding substring
of IDB. Hence after k iterations, if x bits do not change, idB = IDB with probabilty
(1 − 2−k)x. Table 1 shows the probability of equality idB = IDB after k iterations
with several lengths of IDB.
Table 1. the probability of coincident in the worst case with k
iterations.
The number iterations The length of IDB
k (32-bit) (64-bit) (128-bit)
10 96.9% 93.9% 88.2%
11 98.4% 96.9% 93.9%
12 99.2% 98.4% 96.9%
13 99.6% 99.2% 98.4%
Note that table 1, shows the probability of succes in the worst-case for some
number of iterations i.e. the correction of wrong bits is not considered. But in
general, the probabilty of success increases. Let u be the length of IDB. Then there
will be t ≤ u wrong bits in the first candidate idB. So, as mentioned above, after k
July 3, 2018 4:31 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ws-ijqi
An Attack on “Quantum Secure Direct Communication and Authentication Protocol With Single Photons” 5
iterations of the session, ⌈(1− (3/4)k).t⌉ wrong bits, on average, will be corrected.
We consider t = u/2. Table 2 shows the probability of success in the average-case.
Table 2. the probability of coincident in the average case with k
iterations.
The number iterations The length of IDB
k (32-bit) (64-bit) (128-bit)
10 98.4% 96.8% 93.6%
11 99.2% 98.4% 96.8%
12 99.6% 99.1% 98.4%
13 99.8% 99.6% 99.2%
The bit error rate of the transmition channel has not been considered in the
above examples. If it is denoted by δ, since usually δ < ǫ, one can check the results,
which are shown in table 1 and table 2, would not changed noticeably.
5. Conclusion
We have demostrated that Chang et.al’s protocol, is vulnerable to a specific attack,
which is described in this article. Our attack scenario is divided into two scenes.
Since Bob cannot check Alice’s legitimacy, in the first scene, Oscar impersonates
Alice. Then he chooses a candidate binary string for IDB, and corrects the wrong
bits of it by sending a message several times to Bob, due to the original protocol.
After a number of iterations, he obtains IDB, with high enough probability. In
the second scene ,Oscar intercepts the transmission between Alice and Bob, and
impersonates Bob easily. Then he can receive any message which is sent by Alice,
measure the qubits in the correct bases, and finally obtain IDA by breaking a simple
XOR-encryption.
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